Biography
An internationally recognized corporate law scholar, Robert Daines is widely known for his rigorous statistical analysis of empirical data on the relationship between economic theory and corporate governance and contracting in practice. His recent work has focused on issues in corporate governance, such as CEO pay, mandatory disclosure regulations, and the use of classified boards of directors. A respected academic, Professor Daines’ work has appeared in such top publications as the Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization; and Yale Law Journal. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 2004, he was a professor of law at New York University Law School and an associate in the leveraged finance department of Goldman, Sachs & Co., where he advised firms on junk bonds, bank financing, and project finance in emerging markets. Early in his career he clerked for Judge Ralph K. Winters of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Professor Daines has an appointment (by courtesy) with the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Key Works
- Robert M. Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms (Initial Public Offerings), 77 New York University Law Review 1559-1611 (2002).
- Michael Klausner and Robert M. Daines, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 83-120 (April 2001).
- Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 525-558 (2001).
In the News
Courses & Programs
Courses
Programs
Publications & Cases
- Robert M. Daines and Michael Klausner, Economic Analysis of Corporate Law, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Lawrence E. Blume and Stephen Durlauf, eds., New York: Macmillan, 2nd. ed., 2008.
- Robert M. Daines, The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill, Stanford Lawyer, Spring 2005, p. 41.
- Robert M. Daines, The Good, The Bad, And The Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill, University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper Series (2005). (with Vinay B. Nair and Lewis A. Kornhauser)
- Robert M. Daines and Michael Klausner, Agents Protecting Agents: An Empirical Study of Takeover Defenses in Spinoffs, Stanford University Law School. Working Paper (December 16, 2004). 39 pages.
- Robert M. Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms (Initial Public Offerings), 77 New York University Law Review 1559-1611 (2002).
- Michael Klausner and Robert M. Daines, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 83-120 (April 2001).
- Robert M. Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 Journal of Financial Economics 525-558 (2001).
- Michael Klausner and Robert M. Daines, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, New York University Center for Law and Business Working Paper No. 99-015; and Stanford Law School John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 184, pp. 1-49 (January 16, 2000).
- Robert M. Daines, Is There a Delaware Premium?, 21 Corporate Board 22-26 (May/June 2000).
- Robert M. Daines, The Corporate Law Paradox: The Case for Restructuring Corporate Law (Book Review of The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, 102 Yale Law Journal 577-637 (1992).
Affiliations & Honors
Professional Affiliations
- Referee, Journal of Finance
- Referee, Journal of Law and Economics
- Referee, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization
- Referee, Journal of Legal Studies
- Former Chair, Law and Economics Section, Association of American Law Schools
- Former chair/organizer, Corporate and Securities Law: Empirical Section of the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting
- 650 736.2684
- Curriculum Vitae
- SSRN Published Papers
Education
- BS, BA, Brigham Young University, 1989
- JD, Yale Law School, 1992
Expertise
- Business and Corporate Law
- Corporate Governance
- Law and Economics
- Mergers and Acquisitions