A. Mitchell Polinsky
Josephine Scott Crocker Professor of Law and Economics

Publications & Cases

Recent Publications

A. Mitchell Polinsky, Punitive Damages from the Economist's Perspective, in Litigation Services Handbook: The Role of the Accountant as Expert, Roman L. Weil, Michael J. Wagner and Peter B. Frank, eds. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996 Supplement.
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Repeat Offenders and the Theory of Deterrence, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 134 (1996).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Optimal Awards and Penalties when the Probability of Prevailing Varies Among Plaintiffs, 27 Rand Journal of Economics 269-80 (1996).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of-Prevailing Plaintiffs?, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 137 (1996).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Cleanup and Liability After Environmentally Harmful Discharges, 16 Research in Law and Economics 17-24 (1994).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Liability be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 427-37 (1994).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 103 (1993).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer, John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics No. 109 (1993).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4586 (1993).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Should Employees Be Subject to Fines and Imprisionment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?, 13 International Review of Law & Economics 239-57 (1993).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 Georgetown Law Journal 397-435 (1993).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22.4 RAND Journal of Economics 562 (Winter 1991).
A. Mitchell Polinsky with Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 Journal of Public Economics 89-100 (1984).
A. Mitchell Polinsky with Steven Shavell, Contributions and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic Analysis/, 33 Stanford Law Review 447-472 (1981).
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 Journal of Legal Studies 105 (1980).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 The American Economic Review 880-891 (Dec.,1979).