Citation

Publication Date: 1991-01-01
Format: Journal Article
Bibliography: A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22.4 RAND Journal of Economics 562 (Winter 1991).

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