

NAFTA CHAPTER 11 DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM AND MEXICO:  
LEGITIMACY, EVALUATION AND THE CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

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## ABSTRACT

NAFTA's investor-state arbitration process has generated high levels of interest among international law scholars and practitioners. Numerous analysts have informed about the clashes among political, economic and social values that the Eleven Chapter of NAFTA and its Dispute Settlement Mechanism represent. However, little analyses have been conducted under an exclusive Mexican perspective. This article evaluates the effects of NAFTA Chapter 11 Dispute Settlement Mechanism in its tenth anniversary while responding to the question whether the mechanism confers more good than harm to Mexico. Considering the political economy aspects of NAFTA, this evaluation stress the importance of a rule-oriented process to combat some aspects of internal politics and the exercise of political power, placing special interest in the information resulted from the disputes.

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