

**ONLINE PROXY VOTING:
A NEW HOPE FOR SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY?**

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ABSTRACT

This research project investigates how shareholders can participate more meaningfully in corporate governance using internet technology. Relying on similarities with voting for governmental positions, it explores the potentials behind new forms of communication from an interdisciplinary perspective. It introduces a model of online proxy voting that incorporates voting recommendations by third party financial intermediaries such as CalPERS, Calvert, or Greenpeace, and makes them available to individual investors. Using law and economics methodology, the project evaluates the potential of this model to allocate costs more efficiently, overcoming some of the impediments that prevent investors from voting today. Its findings could be used by legislators who wish to encourage online proxy voting.

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