

IS HELEN WORTH IT?
OR
THE EFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST

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Abstract

Traditionally, the USA approached antitrust internationalization with caution. However, a recent official report appears to indicate a policy change of the USA. Within the institutional frameworks of the World Trade Organization and the International Competition Network, the USA finally seems to join forces with the European Union to deepen convergence and cooperation in the field of antitrust. This paper suggests to keep the cautious approach and to determine the appropriate degree of antitrust internationalization solely based on the efficiency criterion. It suggest a three-step procedure to determine the efficient degree of antitrust internationalization. An economic analysis shows that internationalization of antitrust law is not socially beneficial per se, whereas internationalization of antitrust enforcement actually does yield social benefits per se.

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