Will Divestment from Employment-Based Health Insurance Save Employers Money? The Case of State and Local Governments

Details

Author(s):
Publish Date:
2015
Publication Title:
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
Format:
Journal Article Volume 12
Citation(s):
  • Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert, David M. Studdert, Monica S. Farid, and Jay Bhattacharya, Will Divestment From Employment-Based Health Insurance Save Employers Money? The Case of State and Local Governments, 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 343 (2015).

Abstract

Reforms introduced by the Affordable Care and Patient Protection Act (ACA) build new sources of coverage around employment-based health insurance. But what if firms find it cheaper to have their employees obtain insurance from these sources, even after accounting for penalties (for non-provision of insurance) and employee bonuses (to ensure the shift is cost neutral for them)? State and local governments (SLGs) have strong incentives to consider the economics of such “divestment”; many have large unfunded benefits liabilities. We investigated whether SLGs would save under two scenarios: (1) shifting all employees and under-65-retirees to alternative sources of coverage; (2) shifting only employees whose household incomes indicate they would be eligible for federally subsidized coverage and all under-65-retirees. Full divestment would cost SLGs more than they currently pay, due primarily to penalty costs. Selective divestment could save SLGs nearly $119 billion over 10 years at the expense of the federal government.