CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENTIAL RULEMAKING POWER AND THE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT: A FAILED ATTEMPT AT ELECTRICITY REFORM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THE PRESIDENTIAL RULEMAKING POWER
   Who is who? A principal-agent approach
   Constitutional versus Congressional Delegation

III. THE SUPREME COURT AS VETO PLAYER
   The New Composition of the Supreme Court

IV. A GAME OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION: PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND THE MEXICAN SUPREME COURT
   The Activism of the Supreme Court
   The Federal Regulations’ Game

V. PRESIDENT FOX’S ATTEMPT AT ELECTRICITY REFORM
   The “Revolutionary” Debate
   The division within the Supreme Court
   The Court’s reasoning: testing the model
CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIX