Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama

Details

Author(s):
  • Beth A. Colgan
Publish Date:
October 15, 2013
Publication Title:
UCLA Law Review Discourse
Format:
Journal Article Volume 61 Page(s) 262
Citation(s):
  • Beth Colgan, Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 61 UCLA Law Review Discourse 262 (2013).

Abstract

The U.S. Supreme Court announced in Miller v. Alabama, that the mandatory imposition of life in prison without the possibility of parole against juveniles is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1  The million-dollar question is whether it would do any good for the over 20002 juveniles who had previously been so sentenced.  For those jurisdictions that follow or rely heavily on the dictates of retroactivity set out by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane,3 the touchstone of Miller’s retroactivity hinges on whether the rule it announced is substantive—and therefore retroactive—or procedural.4

The Miller opinion provides no clear guidance.  On the one hand, the opinion sounded in procedure, with the Court requiring “that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.”5  On the other hand, the opinion sounded in substantive law, in that it required fundamental changes in criminal laws that mandate the imposition of life without parole in homicide cases where the crime was committed before the defendant’s eighteenth birthday.  Prior to Miller, states and the federal government could require that a court impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile without consideration of the defendant’s youth.